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COMMERCIAL CODE LITIGATION: 2: COMMERCIAL
PAPER; BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS;
BULK TRANSFERS; DOCUMENTS OF TITLE;
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
BY LOUIS F. DEL DUCA*
This article is the second installment of a study commenting on cases
litigated and reported to date under the Uniform Commercial Code. The first
installment' reviewed cases arising under Article 1 (Conflicts of Law) and
Article 2 (Sales). This installment will deal with litigation occurring under
Articles 3 through 9 of the Code. No cases have yet been reported involving
Documentary Letters of Credit (Article 5). Selected effective date issues
arising under Article 10 were noted in the first installment.

ARTICLE 3
COMMERCIAL PAPER
PART
SHORT TITLE,

FORM

1

AND INTERPRETATION

Litigation has arisen involving whether an instrument in which no time
for payment is stated is payable on demand; the negotiability of an instrument authorizing confession of judgment at any time; and the liability
of the maker of a note who signs an incomplete instrument which is
subsequently completed in accordance with authority given by such maker.
In Liberty Aluminum Products Co. v. John Cortis,2 defendant moved
to strike a confessed judgment on the grounds that the promissory note did
not specify a maturity date or schedule of installment payments, and also,
because default was not alleged by plaintiffs at or prior to the entry of
judgment. In denying defendant's motion, the court ruled that Section
3-108 of the Code expressly makes instruments which are "payable at sight
or on presentation and, those in which no time for payment is stated
(emphasis added)" payable on demand. It also concluded that the "failure
to include installment payments simply and clearly means that none were
intended." '3 Possession of the note by the judgment creditor was held to
* A.B., 1950, Temple University; LL.B., 1952, Harvard University; 1953, Hague
Academy of International Law; LL.D., 1954, University of Rome; Professor of Law,
Dickinson School of Law; member Pennsylvania Bar; Consultant to Department of
Revenue, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Commonwealth.
1. Del Duca, Commercial Code Litigation: Conflicts of Law; Sales, 65 DICK. L.
REV. 287 (1961). For a collection of most of the cases discussed herein, see DEL DUcA
AND KING, COMMERCIAL CODE LITIGATION

(1960)

(Mimeographed

son School of Law).
2. 38 Wash. Co. R. 223, 14 D. & C.2d 624 (Pa. 1958).
3. Id. at 225, 14 D. & C.2d at 625.

materials at Dickin-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

create an inference of lack of payment and entry of the judgment was held
4
to constitute sufficient demand for payment.
The assignee of a note in Atlas Credit Corp. v. Leonard,5 entered
judgment thereon and the makers petitioned the court to open the judgment
and allow them to defend. They asserted that it was not a negotiable instrument, thereby precluding plaintiff from claiming immunity from personal
defenses as a holder in due course. It was further alleged that the payee
of the note failed to perform the terms of the construction contract for which
the note was given and that this failure of consideration was a valid defense
against the plaintiff assignee.
Although Section 3-112 (1) (d) of the Code provides that negotiability
is not affected by a term authorizing confession of judgment on an instrument
which is not paid when due, the instrument in question was held nonnegotiable in that it authorized a confession of judgment at any time. The
court concluded that such an instrument was not an unconditional promise
or order to pay a sum certain in money containing no other promise, order,
obligation, or power pursuant to the specifications of Section 3-104 (1)(b)
of the Code. It therefore granted the petition to open judgment since failure
of consideration, although a personal defense not good against a holder
7
in due course,6 is available against a mere assignee.
Century Appliance Co. v. Groff8 involved a petition to open a confessed
judgment on a promissory note on the grounds that although petitioner
had signed the note in blank, the amount entered thereon exceeded the
amount authorized by him. It was also alleged that the service for which
the note was given as payment had been unsatisfactorily performed. The
court cited Section 3-115 (1) of the Code which provides:
When a paper whose contents at the time of signing show that
it is intended to become an instrument is signed while still incomplete in any necessary respect it cannot be enforced until completed, but when it is completed in accordance with authority given
it is effective as completed; .

. .

. The burden of establishing that

any completion is unauthorized is on the party so asserting.
(Emphasis added.)
The court carefully reviewed and extensively quoted the testimony,
concluding that the note in question was completed in accordance with
authority given in that the petitioner had not met the burden of establishing 9
4. The court cited Drey St. M. Co. v. Nevling, 106 Pa. Super. 42 (1932) ; Chubb
v. Kelly, 80 Pa. Super. 487 (1923) ; Sales v. Curzon, 73 Pa. Super. 170 (1919).
5. 56 Lanc. Rev. 57, 15 D. & C.2d 292 (Pa. 1957).

6. U.C.C. § 3-305.
7. U.C.C. § 3-306 (c).
8. 56 Lanc. Rev. 67a (Pa. 1958).
9. The court quoted § 1-201(8) of the Code which defines "burden of establishing"
a fact as "the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of a fact is
-more probable than its non-existence."
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that the completion of the note was unauthorized. It was also noted that
the maker had given a "Borrower's Completion Certificate" to the payee
which certified that all articles and material had been furnished and installed
and that the work on the job had been satisfactorily completed. Observing
that the defect in the performance of the system might very well have
originated from sources other than the contractor's work, the court concluded
that the defendant maker had failed to meet the burden of establishing a
failure of consideration. The petition to open judgment was therefore
denied since the testimony was insufficient to justify submission of the case
to a jury on the issue of unauthorized completion of the instrument or
failure of consideration.
PART

3

RIGHTS OF A HOLDER

The "good faith" requirements for qualifying as a holder in due
course were involved in a case which held invalid a defense based on the
contention that a holder must inquire, prior to acceptance, whether performance has been rendered on the contract underlying the instrument.
Another case has raised the question of the effect of negotiation by a payee
prior to performance under circumstances where a jury might find that the
instrument was transferred and accepted for the express purpose of
cutting off the issuer's defense of lack or failure of consideration. A holder's
transactions with a payee prior to accepting an instrument have also been
held to be relevant regarding the holder's good faith or notice of defenses.
The Code provision specifying that a payee of a note may be a holder in
due course has also been involved in litigation. Several cases relate to
negotiable paper issued as a result of fraudulent representations of payees.
The courts have also invoked the Code provision shifting to a holder the
burden of proving that he has taken the instrument in due course in cases
where a maker or drawer has established a prima facie defense to an
instrument.
First National Bank of Philadelphiav. Anderson1 ° involved the petition
of a maker to open a confessed judgment upon its promissory note. The
grounds upon which the petition was based were: insufficient opportunity
for examination of the contract and note; unauthorized completion of the
note by the payee in respect to amount; defective material supplied under
the contract; and improper completion of the work called for by the contract.
Petitioner further contended that plaintiff did not occupy the status of a
holder in due course in that he failed to ascertain. whether the contract
supporting the note had been satisfactorily completed by the payee.
The court held that it was not incumbent upon one taking a negotiable
10. 5 Bucks 287, 7 D. & C.2d 661 (Pa. 1956).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

instrument to inquire into the performance of the underlying contract in
order to gain the rights of a holder in due course. It stated that to deprive
one of the status of a holder in due course, proof was required that he had
actual knowledge of an infirmity or defect, or of such facts that a failure
to make further inquiry would indicate a deliberate desire to avoid knowledge possibly disclosing a vice in the transaction." It was noted by the
court that even though the cases it cited were decided under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, there were no provisions in the Code altering the good
12
faith concept.
The maker argued that even if the plaintiff were a holder in due course
it would nevertheless be subject to the real defenses set forth in Section
3-305 (c) which, inter alia, provides that a holder in due course takes the
instrument subject to "such misrepresentation as has induced the party to
sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms." The court
observed that the Comments to this provision of the Code indicate a number
of factors to be taken into consideration in determining the availability of
the defense of fraud in the factum. It remarked that:
Among these are age and sex of the party, his intelligence, education and business experience, his ability to read or understand
English, representations made to him and his reason to rely on

them or have confidence in the person making them, the presence
or absence of any third party who might read or explain it to him
and the apparent necessity or lack of it, for acting without delay.' 3
In the instant case, the three co-makers in each others presence signed
the instrument after having been given a full opportunity to read and seek
information regarding its contents. All were literate, one being employed
as a book-keeping clerk in the revenue accounting department of a public
utility.
11. First National Bank of Blairstown v. Goldbert, 340 Pa. 337, 340, 17 A.2d
377, 379 (1941) ; Davis, Trustee v. Pennsylvania Company, 337 Pa. 456, 459, 460, 12
A.2d 66, 68, 69 (1940) ; Union Bank and Trust Co. v. Girard Trust Co., 307 Pa.
488, 500, 501, 161 Atl. 865, 868, 869 (1932); Phelan v. Moss, 67 Pa. 59 (1870).
12. In emphasizing this point, the court stated:
True, Section 1-201 defines good faith as being honesty in fact and under
Section 3-302 good faith includes the observance of the reasonable commercial
standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged. No evidence

was presented, however, indicating that the failure to make inquiry of the
payee or the maker of the note as to the satisfactory completion of the contract
was in any sense a divergence from common banking or commercial practice.
On the contrary, if a holder of an instrument were required to investigate in
each instance whether the contract had been completed satisfactorily before

accepting it, the burden placed on the free flow of negotiable paper would be
almost insurmountable.
Note that under the current edition of the Code, the "reasonable commercial standards"
concept of § 3-302 has been deleted.
13. Supra note 10, at 291, 7 D. & C.2d at 667.
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The court further observed that the "fraud in factum" defense under
Section 3-305 of the Code was not indicative of a legislative intention to
alter the well established rule that failure to read a written contract is not
an excuse or a defense and cannot justify avoidance, modification or
nullification of the contract or any of its provisions. As to the allegation
of unauthorized completion of the note, the court concluded that the
instrument was completed in accordance with the authority given and was
4
therefore, pursuant to Section 3-115, effective as completed.'
In Budget Charge Accounts Inc. v. Mullaney, 15 an appeal was taken
from an order of the lower court opening a confessed judgment entered
by the holder of a promissory note. The makers alleged the absence of any
knowledge that the document they were signing was a judgment note. They
also contended that their signatures were obtained by false representations
of the payee to the effect that they had won a free clothes dryer and would
be paid 20 dollars each for interviews obtained for the payee with prospective
purchasers. Defendants further alleged that the dryer which was delivered
pursuant to the agreement was defective and that upon learning of the payee's
fraudulent activities, they attempted to rescind the transaction. The first
knowledge received by the makers that a holder was making a claim on
the note was the receipt of a monthly payment book from appellant.
Defendants never made any payments on the note and immediately notified
appellant that they had been defrauded and asked that the dryer be removed.
The court preliminarily ruled that this defense was prima facie
meritorious as to the payee, and that the burden of establishing the status
of a holder in due course therefore shifted to appellant. 16 It then noted
that Section 3-302 of the Code requires a holder in due course to take
the instrument for value, in good faith, including observance of the reasonable
commercial standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged,
and without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it by any person. The court ruled that there
was merit in the makers' contention that the negotiation thereof to the
holder, "even before the installation of the dryer, might well raise a jury
question as to whether the negotiation was for the purpose of cutting off the
defense of fraud in the inception and so affecting the good faith of the
holder."' 7 The conclusion was therefore reached that the lower court acted
14. The court also noted that under U.C.C. § 3-407(2) an unauthorized completion amounting to a material alteration would not be an effective defense against
a subsequent holder in due course.
15. 187 Pa. Super. 190, 144 A.2d 438 (1958).
16. U.C.C. § 3-307(3) and comments thereto. The 1952 Code provided that
"After evidence of a defense has been introduced" the burden was on the one claiming
to be a holder in due course. The 1958 Code amended this section and it now provides
that "After it is shown that a defense exists," the burden will shift.
17. Supra note 15, at 194, 144 A.2d at 440.
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within the bounds of its discretionary power in granting the petition to
open judgment.
The maker-defendant, in Potter Bank and Trust Co. v. Henneforth,1 s
petitioned the court to open a judgment confessed by the holder on grounds
that plaintiff was not a holder in due course of a note because it had not
exercised good faith in discounting same for the original payee. The court
overruled plaintiff's objection to defendant's interrogatories pertaining to
transactions which the holder had had with the payee prior to taking the
note, stating that:
Evidence which tends to show that the plaintiff had such knowledge' 9 was relevant and necessary for the defendants to prove in
order to carry their burden. Such knowledge on the part of the
plaintiff can properly be shown by evidence of prior transactions
all of which are similiar in context and subject matter and involved
the original payee and the holder of the note. The knowledge gained
by the plaintiff from any prior transactions had with the payee
20
of this note is extremely pertinent in this case. (Footnote added.)
However, on grounds of irrelevancy, the court sustained objections to
interrogatories pertaining to transactions between plaintiff and the payee
after the plaintiffs discounted the note.
The court in Mellen v. Gora2 l denied plaintiff's motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Plaintiff, as one of the payees of the note, claimed the
status of a holder in due course. The court recognized that by virtue of
Section 3-302 (2) of the Code, a payee could occupy the status of a holder
in due course. However, since defendant alleged that plaintiff had notice
of certain infirmities inherent in the note by virtue of his participation in
the underlying agreements, a question of fact was presented. It was therefore ruled that a jury must determine whether plaintiff took the note in
"good faith" and "without notice."
In Equitable Discount Corporation v. Bisiganani,22 the holder of three
negotiatable trade acceptances moved for judgment on the pleadings in an
action against the acceptor. Defendant's signature thereon was admitted
and plaintiff alleged that it took the instruments for value, in good faith,
without notice of defenses and before maturity. Defendant's answer contended that the instruments were misrepresented by the drawer's agent to
18. 74 Mont. Co. L.R. 420 (Pa. 1958).
19. As in the Anderson case, supra note 10, the court ruled that to defeat the
rights of one claiming to be a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument, the
maker had to prove that the holder had actual knowledge of an infirmity or defect
or of such facts that a failure to make further inquiry would indicate a deliberate
desire on his part to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that investigation
would disclose a vice in the transaction.
20. Supra note 18, at 422.
21. 70 York Leg. Rec. 1 (Pa. 1956).
22. 60 Lack. Jr. 223 (Pa. 1959).

1961]

COMMERCIAL CODE LITIGATION

be terms of payment as part of a separate contract and that defendant was
tricked and induced to sign the acceptances "not knowing what they were"
and without "having reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or . . . essential terms. ' 23 The court noted that both under
Section 3-305 (2) (c) of the Code and prior case law, this answer averred
fraud in the factum, which was valid as a real defense even against a
holder in due course. It concluded that sufficient facts had been alleged to
warrant submission of the case to the jury and therefore denied the motion
2 4
for judgment on the pleadings.
In Equitable Discount Corp. v. Fischer,25 the court denied defendant's
motion for a new trial made after a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff
in an action to recover as a holder in due course of three trade acceptances.
Defendant had executed and delivered the instruments to Sterling Materials
Co. in payment of certain roofing materials which he later refused to accept.
The Sterling representative had the defendant sign, telling him that such
were in the nature of notes and would be put through a bank. Defendant
had no prior experience in dealing with trade acceptances, and did not
know what they were; he was, however, familiar with the writing of checks.
Although seeking no advice before signing, he did know that payments were
due on certain dates. On the day following his execution of the instruments,
defendant consulted the Dun and Bradstreet ratings regarding the reputation
of Sterling Materials Co. He then cancelled the order and refused delivery
of the materials.
The court held that plaintiff was clearly a holder in due course, the
three trade acceptances having been purchased for value, before maturity,
in the regular course of business, and prior to dishonor. Thus, the plaintiff
took the trade acceptances free from all defenses on the part of the defendant
except those real defenses set forth in Section 3-305. In sustaining the directed
verdict for plaintiff, the court ruled that defendant had not presented facts
warranting submission to the jury of the question whether he had been
induced to sign the instrument pursuant to misrepresentations and without
knowledge or reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character
or essential terms. 26 In so holding, the court noted that defendant had been
told that he was signing three trade acceptances, that they were in the
nature of a note and would be processed through a bank. Further, there was
no indication that misrepresentations had been made by the Sterling representative. The court also noted that defendant had been in business for
almost forty years, obviously considered himself capable of transacting
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 224.
The court cited .Budget Charges Account, Inc., v. Mullaney, supra note 15.
55 Lanc. Rev. 381, 12 D. & C.2d 326 (Pa. 1957).
U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(c).
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business without the aid or assistance of anyone else, and therefore was
not excusably ignorant of the contents of the instruments.
The court, in Bachman and Co. Inc. v. Brubaker,27 denied a petition
to open a confessed judgment where the plaintiff-holder received no notice,
until some ten months after the note's negotiation to him by the payee, that
the freezer given in consideration thereof to the maker was defective. In
response to the defendant-maker's petition, plaintiff alleged that he took the
instrument for value, in good faith and without notice of any defects; to
this, the defendant failed to respond. The court therefore ruled that plaintiff
had carried the burden of proof imposed on it by Section 3-307 of the Code
which, after evidence of a defense has been introduced by a maker, requires
a holder to carry the burden of establishing that he is in all respects a holder
in due course.
In First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. v. DeLise,28 the superior
court reversed a lower court decision denying the makers' petition to open
a judgment confessed on his note by a holder thereof. The makers alleged
that payee obtained their signatures by fraud, that the consideration for the
note had failed, that the plaintiff bank had notice of dishonor and that a
valid defense existed prior to negotiation to the bank. Plaintiff denied any
misrepresentations and further denied receipt of notice of dishonor. The
makers testified that they were under the impression that the legal size
paper which they signed concerned the making of repairs only and that they
did not suspect they were signing a judgment note. They further contended
that immediately upon discovering the true nature of the transaction and
prior to negotiation to plaintiff, they advised plaintiff of the fraud and of
the unsatisfactory nature of the payee's work. To the contrary plaintiff
maintained that notice by the makers of unsatisfactory performance was
first received subsequent to the note's negotiation to it. However, plaintiff
introduced no testimony as to the date or circumstances of its purchase of
the note.
The court ruled that after the maker had introduced evidence of its
defense, Section 3-307 (3) imposed on plaintiff the burden of proving it was
a holder in due course. Since the indorsement was undated and plaintiff
did not introduce testimony of the circumstances under which the note was
negotiated, it was held that plaintiff failed to meet this burden of proof. The
court also ruled that a telephone call by the makers prior to negotiation to
the plaintiff, advising of their refusal to pay unless certain required work was
done, constituted sufficient notice of a claim of defense under Section 3-508
(3) of the Code. This section provides that notice may be given in any
reasonable manner; either orally or in writing, and in any terms which
27. 56 Lane. Rev. 289 (Pa. 1958).
28. 186 Pa. Super 398, 142 A.2d 401 (1958).
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identify the instrument and state that it has been dishonored. The plaintiff
bank alternatively contended that the makers of the notes had waived their
rights accruing from notice of dishonor by voluntarily beginning payments
on the note some five months after notice was given to the bank. The court
ruled that payments made after threats of foreclosure and sheriff sale could
be considered neither as constituting a waiver, nor as a ratification of the
negotiation of the instrument.
PART

4

LIABILITY OF PARTIES

In Grange National Bank v. Conville,29 the court held a husband and
wife liable on a promissory note to which they had affixed their individual
signatures as well as the signature of the firm which employed them, without
indicating their relationship to the firm. In denying defendants' petition
to open a judgment entered by the payee bank, the court noted that under
Section 3-402 of the Code, a signature is presumed to be an endorsement
unless the instrument on its face clearly indicates that the signature is made
in some other capacity. The court also quoted and relied on Section 3-403 (2)
which provides:
An authorized representative who signs his name to an instrument
is also personally obligated unless the instrument names the person
represented and shows that the signature is made in a representative capacity. The name of an organization preceded or followed
by the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature
made in a representative capacity.
It concluded that the court rather than a jury should determine the capacity
in which the representatives signed the instrument, and that any ambiguities
regarding capacity which arose on examination of the four corners of the
instrument should be resolved against the representatives. Defendant's
alternative request for reformation on the grounds of mutual mistake was
also denied in that the testimony as to the making of a mistake was not
clear, precise, and indubitable and was not of such weight and directness
as to justify submission of the question to a jury.
The employer whose signature was affixed to the note was held
not liable thereon. The court, relying on Section 3-401 (1) of the Code
which provides that "No person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon," apparently reasoned that a principal is not
liable on a note where his agent merely signs the principal's name without
disclosing the agency, even though the agent may have actually been authorized to sign for the principal.
Huntingdon County v. First Grange National Bank of Huntingdon30
29. 5 Lyc. 170, 8 D. & C.2d 616 (Pa. 1956).
30. 20 D. & C.2d 418 (Pa. 1959).
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involved the unauthorized use of a rubber stamp signature by a county
employee. Plaintiffs, a county and one of its institution districts, furnished
an employee with a rubber stamp for his use in negotiating checks for
deposit. Although the employee was not authorized to cash checks, the
rubber stamp contained no words of restriction, merely stating "Huntingdon
County Commissioners, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania." Through an improper
utilization of this stamp, the employee cashed certain checks belonging to
plaintiffs and converted the proceeds to his own use.
The court held the defendant bank liable to plaintiffs for money which
it had collected from the various drawee banks. The basis for the decision
was that the clerk had no actual, implied or apparent authority to endorse
the checks for collection. Under applicable state statutes, 31 the clerk's
authority was strictly limited to transferring monies collected to the county
treasurer who in turn was required to deposit all such funds on the behalf
of the county commissioners and its agencies. The court concluded that
under these circumstances, even though defendant bank had no actual
notice that the clerk was not authorized to cash checks and had no intention
of aiding him in perpetrating the fraud, it was nevertheless bound to know
that the clerk's endorsement of the checks for the purpose of cashing them
was an unauthorized endorsement. In support of its conclusion that payment
of the check proceeds to the clerk constituted conversion of funds belonging
to the county and institution district, the court cited Section 3-404 of the
Code which provides that "Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative
as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded
from denying it ...."32
Defendant also contended that it had a valid defense on alternative
grounds with reference to checks payable to guests of the county home and
endorsed by them in blank over to the county. It maintained that such
checks became bearer instruments negotiated to it for value, in good faith
and without notice of any defects. The court ruled that, since the clerk
before cashing these checks affixed the rubber stamp endorsement of the
county commissioners thereon, the bank had actual notice that the checks
were county property and was therefore liable thereon.
In Abercrombie Estate,33 the court denied plaintiff's claim against
an estate based on a check purporting to be payable to her and signed by
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 362 (1956) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1760 (1956)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2252 (1941).

32. The court noted that the comments to § 3-404 state that the term "unauthorized
signature ... includes both a forgery and a signature made by an agent exceeding
his actual or apparent authority." It also observed that § 1-201(43) of the Code
provides that an "Unauthorized signature means without actual, implied or apparent
authority and includes a forgery."
33. 20 D. & C.2d 496 (Pa. 1959).
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the deceased. The check in question bore a blurred date, contained an
erasure in the place where the name of the payee appeared, and apparently
had been trimmed with a scissors. Although the court, citing Section 3-407
(1),3 4 concluded that these items constituted material alterations, plaintiff
had offered no evidence to explain them. For this reason and because the
deceased's signature was not admitted and the testimony presented did not
establish that the signature was that of the deceased, the court held inapplicable Section 3-307 (2) of the Code which, absent a defense, entitles
a holder to recover "when signatures are admitted or established" on an
instrument which is produced.
Because of the apparent material alterations on the face of the instrument, the court also ruled that the burden of proving that they were
not fraudulent or material fell on the payee. Since she failed to carry this
burden of proof, the instrument was held inadmissable in evidence and the
liability of the drawer thereon discharged.3 5 In support of its ruling in favor
of the drawer, the court also cited Section 3-407 (2) of the Code which
provides that "As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due
course (a) alteration by a holder which is both fraudulent and material
discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed unless that party
assents or is precluded from asserting the defense ...."
Apparently in anticipation of the defense of failure of consideration,
the plaintiff-payee also attempted to prove that she gave consideration in
exchange for the check. The court found the testimony of plaintiff's witness
on this point "incredible" and ruled that the voluntary and unsuccessful
attempt to prove the consideration underlying the checks relieved the
drawer from the burden of proving lack of consideration.3 6
In Insdorf v. Wil-Avon Merchandise Mart, Inc.,37T the drawer of a
check objected to a complaint filed by the payee thereof which alleged that
it was given "for a valuable consideration, namely, the settlement of accounts between the parties thereto." Defendant contended that plaintiff failed
to aver with particularity the accounts between the parties for which the check
was allegedly given in settlement and requested a more specific complaint.
The court cited Section 3-408 of the Code which expressly provides that "no
34. U.C.C. § 3-407(1) provides, "Any alteration of an instrument is material
which changes the contract of any party thereto in any respect, including any such
change in . . . (c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of
it."
35. Citing Poelcher v. Zink, 375 Pa. 539, 101 A.2d 628 (1954); Miners Savings
Bank of Pittston v. Naylor, 342 Pa. 273, 20 A.2d 287 (1941) ; Simpson v. Stackhouse,
9 Pa. 186 (1848).
36. Citing Katz v. Katz, 309 Pa. 115, 163 Atl. 214 (1932); Tate v. Connor,
184 Pa. Super. 427, 135 A.2d 799 (1957) ; Calanno Estate, 14 D. & C.2d 153 (Pa. 1958).
See note 16, supra.
37. 8 Chest. Co. Rep. 341 (Pa. 1958).
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consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in
38
payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation of any kind."
It held that the allegation in question was mere surplusage since it was
actually unnecessary to establish consideration in such circumstances.
In Union Bank v. Mobilla,3 9 defendant, a dealer in used automobiles,
discounted with plaintiff an installment sales contract accompanied by a
judgment note allegedly executed by the purchaser of an automobile. When
both the maker and defendant refused to pay the note, plaintiff instituted
action against the dealer. The theory of plaintiff's action was grounded on
warranty liability. There appeared in the written security agreement the
statement that "The above instrument is genuine and in all respects what
it purports to be." The plaintiff also pleaded the implied warranty of a
transferor that the note is genuine. The auto dealer defended on the grounds
that he endorsed the note "without recourse," and that the signature of the
person who appeared as the maker of the note was affixed by an authorized
agent. Defendant further contended that plaintiff could not recover as an
item of damage the 15 percent attorney fee provided for in the warrant to
confess judgment.
The court ruled that both under the common law and under Section
3-417 (2)(a) of the Code, one who presents a document for discount and
accepts a consideration for its transfer impliedly warrants that all signatures
are genuine or authorized, and this is so, even when the transfer is by way
of restrictive endorsement. The court further held that the defendant could
readily have avoided liability for the collection of attorney's fees by paying
the debt when due. Having failed to do so, the item of collection fees
became a substantial element of the plaintiff's damages and could be recovered
as consequential damages resulting from breach of the express and implied
warranties.
ARTICLE IV
BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
PART
RELATIONSHIP

4

BETWEEN PAYOR AND

ITS CUSTOMER

In National Bank of Slatington v. Derhammer (Case No. 1),40 the
initial complaint filed by plaintiff bank sought to hold a cosignatory to a
joint account liable for 150 dollars which the bank had paid the "defendant
or her cosignatory" against a check of 4,950 dollars (drawn upon a
fictional bank) with which such account was opened. Plaintiff also sought
to hold defendant liable for 2,800 dollars which it paid to the "account
38. Id. at 342.
39. 43 Erie Co. L. J. 45 (Pa. 1959).
40. 27 Leh. L. J. 519, 16 D. & C.2d 286 (Pa. 1958).
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owners" on a check signed by "one of the joint makers." Defendant's
motion for a more specific pleading was sustained by the court because the
complaint did not allege any wrongdoing by her and also for the reason
that in her capacity as a cosignatory to an account she was not answerable
for overdrafts by the cosignatory out of her own funds over and above those
intrusted to the joint account. The court noted that Section 4-212 subjects
a customer to refund upon dishonor of an item for collection and Section
4-104 defines customer as "any person having an account." However, it
concluded that this language was not sufficient to impose upon a cosignatory
"partnership type" liability in which not only the account assets, but all assets
of the cosignatory would be endangered by the machinations of the joint
owner of the account. In National Bank of Slatington v. Derhammer (Case
No. 2), 4 1 plaintiff amended its complaint pursuant to the court's earlier
ruling and alleged that defendant introduced the fraudulent cosignatory to
the bank official and "falsely and fradulently represented with intent to
deceive the plaintiff that the defendant had known said [cosignatory] all
of her life and was engaged to be married to the said [cosignatory] and
that she impliedly represented that [he] was a man of good moral character,
whereas, in fact his character was bad which fact was known or should
have been known to the defendant. ' 42 It not only alleged that the 4,950
dollar check with which the account was opened was fictional, but also
that the defendant knew or should have known that fact. The court, overruling defendant's demurrer to this complaint, sustained its validity and
instructed her to answer on the merits.
In Dinger v. Market Street Trust Co.,43 plaintiff sought recovery from
the defendant bank for losses incurred when defendant failed to honor stop
payment notices executed by plaintiff and given to defendant's employees.
Defendant denied receiving any orders and moved for a more specific complaint. The motion was based on plaintiff's failure to sufficiently identify the
bank employee with whom the order was placed. The plaintiff merely alleged
that sometime between March and July of 1954, it had orally informed the
defendant not to pay the instruments in question or charge any of them
to his account, and, at the request of defendant's employees, had executed
a "stop payment order" on a form provided by the bank.
In support of the court's decision to sustain defendant's motion for
more definite pleadings, the court cited Section 4-403 of the Code which
provides:
(2) An oral order is binding upon the bank only until the customer has had reasonable opportunity to send the bank a written
41. 28 Leh. L. J. 41, 16 D. & C.2d 290 (Pa. 1958).
42. Id. at 42, 16 D. & C.2d at 291.
43. 69 Dauph. 236, 7 D. & C.2d 674 (Pa. 1956).
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confirmation if the bank requests such a confirmation. A written
44
order is effective for only six months unless renewed in writing.
(3) The burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss
resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop
payment order is on the customer. (Emphasis added.)
ARTICLE 6
BULK TRANSFERS
In Brooks v. Lambert,46 plaintiff, a judgment creditor, conceding that
46
judicial sales are not subject to the bulk sales provisions of the Code,
nevertheless sought to set aside a sale to other creditors of equipment and
fixtures, excluding the liquor license, of a combination taproom-eating
47
establishment, on the ground of non-compliance with the notice and application of proceeds 48 requirements of the bulk sales article of the Code. The
4°
court, citing cases decided under Pennsylvania's previous Bulk Sales Act,
concluded that a "restaurant business with a liquor license or a combination
bar and taproom, or a combination restaurant and taproom, is within the
contemplation of the act [Commercial Code] as to all save presumably the
liquor itself which under the liquor control board's regulations, can only be
50
In so decidsold to another licensee under its supervision and approval."
ing, the court did not cite and apparently did not consider Section 6-102 (3)
of the Bulk Sales Article of the Code which provides "The enterprises
subject to this article are all those whose principal business is the sale of
merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture what they sell."
The court also did not mention and apparently did not consider the Comments to this section which provide that:
The businesses covered are defined in subsection (3). Notice
that they do not include farming nor contracting nor professional
services, nor such things as cleaning shops, barber shops, pool halls,
hotels, restaurants, and the like whose principal business is the
sale not of merchandise but of services. While some bulk sales
risk exists in the excluded businesses, they have in common the
fact that unsecured credit is not commonly extended on the face of
a stock of merchandise. 1
44. The 1958 Code has amended this subsection to read that "An oral order is
binding upon the bank only for fourteen calendar days unless confirmed in writing
within period." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 4-403(2) (Supp. 1960).
45. 10 D. & C.2d 237 (Pa. 1957).
46. U.C.C. § 6-103(4).
47. U.C.C. § 6-104.
48. U.C.C. § 6-106.
49. Pa. Laws 1919, act 104, § 5.
50. Stein, etc., v. Goldberg, 2 D. & C.2d 562 (Pa. 1954); Plumer v. Flynn, 86
D. & C. 47 (Pa. 1953); Goodis v. Sawitt, 83 D. & C. 350 (Pa. 1952) ; Lazofson v.
Steiner, 66 D. & C. 179 (Pa. 1948).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 A, § 6-102, comment 2 (1954).
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However, it was held that the particular transaction under consideration
was not subject to the requirements of Article 6 of the Code. The court
cited Section 6-102 (1) and (2), which provide that the transfer of a substantial part of the equipment of an "enterprise" subject to Article 6 will
constitute a bulk transfer only if made in connection with a bulk transfer of
inventory. In the instant case, the court noted that the vendor of the
goods had been conducting no business for some time prior to the sale
in question. Its charter had been forfeited, the premises padlocked and
the license revoked. For this reason, and because the stock of a business
of this nature generally consists of goods not saleable in bulk, the conclusion
was reached that only equipment and fixtures were sold. Therefore, since
no inventory was transferred in bulk, Article 6 was held inapplicable.
In Uhr v. 3361, Inc.,5 2 the court, citing Brooks v. Lambert as authority,

ruled that the sale of a restaurant-taproom business constituted a bulk sale
under the Code. Having concluded that the business was an "enterprise"
subject to the bulk sales article, the court also held these provisions applicable
despite the lack of privity of contract between the purchaser and plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the vendor. Defendants also objected to plaintiff's complaint on grounds that it failed to allege that the bulk sale transaction was not for the purpose of liquidating a security interest. The court
ruled that such requirement was not placed on a creditor invoking the
Bulk Sales Article. It reasoned that this defense, although permissible under
Section 6-103 (3), nevertheless constituted a claim for exemption from the
general provisions of the statute and the burden of proving that the exemption is applicable therefore falls on the party claiming it.
The court, in Market v. College Offset Press, Inc., 53 held that a printing
business is not encompassed by the definition of "enterprise" as defined in
Section 6-102 of the Code and therefore is not subject to its bulk sales
provisions. The mere averment in a complaint that a defendant operates
a printing business was held insufficient without an additional averment
that the defendant's principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock.
In Trau and Loevner, Inc., v. Routnwn,5 4 plaintiff brought an action
against defendant and directed the sheriff to attach defendant's goods in the
hands of individuals who had allegedly obtained the goods as part of a bulk
sale transfer in violation of the notice provisions of Article 6 of the Code.
The initial writ of attachment was improperly served and therefore invalid.
The garnishees contended that a second writ, although properly served,
was nevertheless invalid since it was issued more than six months after the
date on which the transfer of the property in the bulk sales transaction had
52. 21 D. & C.2d 348 (Pa. 1960).
53. 6 D. & C.2d 519 (Pa. 1955).
54. 6 D. & C.2d 164 (Pa. 1955).
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occurred. The court, sustaining the garnishee's objections, cited Section
6-111 which specified that "No action under this article shall be brought
more than six months after the date on which the transferee took possession
of the goods."
ARTICLE 7
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
PART 2
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS

In United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Mooney's Moving
and Storage, Inc.,55 plaintiff sued for recovery of damages caused by
defendant's negligence in the maintenance of its warehouse. Defendant's
answer set forth that the terms of the warehouse receipt specified that the
goods were stored at the customer's risk with respect to damage caused by
fire; that the burden of proving negligence was on the customer; and, that
the customer must file a claim in writing within 30 days after written notice
of the damage was mailed to the customer at his last known address. The
court sustained plaintiff's contention that the fire damage clause constituted
an attempt to abrogate a warehouseman's liability regardless of negligence,
and, therefore, was against public policy and invalid. The court ruled that
although a warehouseman is not an insurer he is obliged to exercise ordinary
care in the prevention of fire and arresting those already in progress.56
Since the warehouseman was not an insurer, the court held that the burden
of proving negligence was properly placed on the customer. It also sustained
the validity of the 30 day written notice provision of the warehouse receipt
on grounds that it was not unreasonable. In support of this latter conclusion,
the court cited Section 7-204 (2) of the Code which recites that: "Reasonable
provision as to the time and manner of presenting claims and instituting
actions based on the bailment may be included in the warehouse receipt or
tariff."
ARTICLE 8
INVESTMENT SECURITIES
PART 3
PURCHASE

In Morrison & Markham v. Liberty Discount & Savings Bank,57
plaintiff asked for a mandatory order compelling transfer and payment of
accrued dividends withheld on certain shares of stock and an injunction
55. 16 D. & C.2d 668 (Pa. 1958).
56. Schell v. Miller North Broad Storage Co., Inc., 157 Pa. Super. 101, 42 A.2d
180 (1945), aff'd., 353 Pa. 319, 45 A.2d 53 (1946).
57. 61 Lack. Jur. 37 (Pa. 1959).
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preventing transfer or issue of substituted shares to any other claimant.
Plaintiff claimed ownership of the stock in defendant bank on the basis of the
endorsement and delivery to him. An only heir of the deceased record
shareholder claimed it as executrix and heir of the decedent's estate. She
also claimed the stock on the grounds that prior to the death of the
deceased, the bank had paid the dividends on such stock to her, and that
no claim of adverse ownership was made by plaintiff. The defendant bank
interpleaded the parties. The court ruled that the endorsement in blank
of the stock by the deceased and its transfer to plaintiff prior to her death,
at a time when she was competent, made him the rightful owner thereof. 58
As a holder who acquired the shares by delivery after endorsement in blank,
the plaintiff also had the right to convert the blank endorsement into a
special endorsement by designating himself as the transferee.5 9 The court
noted that the right to reclaim or obtain possession of a security may be
enforced and its transfer enjoined if such transfer to the purchaser is
wrongful as against any person. 60 However, since no wrongful transfer was
established by the executrix in this case the court ruled that the issuing
61
bank must register the transfer to plaintiff.
In Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij,N. V. v. Sentry Corp.,62 plaintiff, a Dutch corporation with its principal place of United States business
in New York City, instituted a foreign attachment proceeding to recover
as holder in due course on two overdue promissory notes. These instruments were issued by defendant, a Delaware corporation, whose principal
place of business was in Philadelphia. Plaintiff, by way of ancillary proceedings, filed a complaint in equity against the defendant seeking a mandatory
injunction ordering and directing defendant to deliver the stock of four of its
subsidiaries (which were not incorporated in or doing business in Pennsylvania) so that they might be subjected to the foreign attachment. Defendant
then exercised its right to remove the litigation to the Federal District
Court. While sustaining the garnishment of an account which defendant had
in a Pennsylvania bank, the court also upheld defendant's objection to the
attachment of the non-Pennsylvania subsidiary stock since such was outside
63
the geographical limits of the court and not subject to its decree.
58.
59.
60.
61.

U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.

§ 8-313.
§ 8-308(2).
§ 8-315.

§ 8-401: In 1959, Pennsylvania revised this section (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, § 8-401 (Supp. 1960)) to conform with the revised Code.
62. 163 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
63. U.C.C. § 8-317(1) was cited which states that:
No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest evidenced
thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the security is actually seized
by the officer making the attachment or levy but a security which has been
surrendered to the issuer may be attached or levied upon at the source.
The court also ruled that U.C.C. § 8-317(2) would be of no avail to plaintiff. This
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in Puerto Rico for the estate
6 4
the case of Parkhurst Estate.
checking account and a "safe
containing stocks which were

registered "as joint tenants with right of survivorship. . .

."

in the name of

decedent and other persons who were residents of Pennsylvania. The judicial
administrator filed a petition in the courts of Pennsylvania requesting that
the bank be ordered to deliver the balance of the checking account and all stock
certificates in the "safe keeping account." The bank questioned the jurisdiction of the court to issue such a decree. In citing various authorities including
Section 8-317 of the Code, the court ruled that the presence of the stock in
Pennsylvania gave it general jurisdiction over the assets in question. In refusing to grant the request of the Puerto Rican administrator, the court chose to
exercise its discretionary power to prevent the withdrawal of assets from
the state. Its purpose was to avoid forcing Pennsylvania citizens to travel
to a distant forum to have their rights in the assets determined.6 5 The
court felt that the notice which Pennsylvania claimants would obtain
through advertising for an audit would not be guaranteed in an adversary
proceeding in which only the foreign judicial administrator and the bank
would be involved.
ARTICLE 9
SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT
RIGHTS AND CHATTEL PAPER
PART I
SHORT TITLE,

APPLICABILITY AND

DEFINITIONS

6
In Industrial Packaging Productsv. Fort Pitt Packaging International,"
a Pennsylvania firm (Fort Pitt) borrowed money from a New York lender

section provides that:
A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a security shall be entitled to such

aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or otherwise, in
reaching such security or in satisfying the claim by means thereof as is
allowed at law or in equity in regard to property which cannot readily be
attached or levied upon by ordinary legal process.
This result is in accord with the comments to U.C.C. § 8-317 which provide:
In dealing with investment securities the instrument itself is the vital thing
and therefore a valid levy cannot be made unless all possibility of the security
finding its way into a transferee's hands has been removed. This can be
accomplished only when the security has been reduced to possession by a
public officer or by the issuer. A holder who has been enjoined can still
transfer the security in contempt of court ....
Therefore, although injunctive
relief is provided in subsection (2) so that creditors may use this method to
gain control of the security, the security itself must be reached to constitute
a proper levy ....
64. 14 D. & C.2d 661 (Pa. 1958).
65. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320. 1101 (1950).
66. 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960).
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giving an assignment of future accounts receivable as security for the loan.
The security agreement specified that the "agreement and performance
thereof shall in all respects be governed by and in accordance with the
laws of the state of New York." Fort Pitt's receiver in bankruptcy petitioned
the court to declare the assignment ineffective as a secured indebtedness
since the New York lender had never filed financing statements covering
the assignment in Pennsylvania. Citing Section 9-103 of the Code, 67 the
court sustained the receiver's contention that Pennsylvania rather than New
York law governed the transaction.
The court noted that under Section 1-10568 of the Code the parties are
free to choose the law of a state which bears a "reasonable relationship" to
their transaction unless the transaction falls within specific conflicts rules
(like Section 9-103). If the specific conflicts rules do apply, then their
application is mandatory. Since the debtor's accounts receivable records
were in Pennsylvania, the court ruled that recording in Pennsylvania was
necessary to perfect the New York lender's security interest.
While the New York lender had not so recorded its security interest
in the accounts receivable, the security agreement provided that Fort Pitt
should assign the proceeds from the accounts to Provident Trust Co., a
Pennsylvania firm. Provident Trust Co. was to act as agent for the New
York lender in collecting and receiving payment on the loan. Approximately
two years prior to the execution of the security agreement and the creation
of this agency relationship, the Provident Trust Co. had, for its own purposes, duly filed a financing statement in Pennsylvania. This statement
named the same Fort Pitt as debtor and Provident Trust as the secured
party. The financing statement covered "all present and future accounts
receivable submitted." The court noted that the purpose of filing is to give
notice of encumbrances to the debtor's potential creditors or purchasers and
concluded that it is of no consquence "as far as such notice is concerned whether the secured party listed in the filing statement is a
principal or an agent, and no provision in the Uniform Commercial Code
draws such a distinction." 69 The agent's initial filing was therefore held
sufficient to perfect the principal's security interest in the accounts receivable,
there being no requirement that the secured party listed in the financing
statement be a principal creditor and not an agent.70 Also, the accounts
receivable fell within the collateral described in the financing statement
67. U.C.C. § 9-103 provides that "If the office where the assignor of the accounts
... keeps his records concerning them is in this state, validity and perfection of a
security interest therein and the possibility and effect of proper filing is governed by
this article .. "
68. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1958); This was orginally provided for in § 1-105(6)

(1952).
69.

Supra note 66, at 648, 161 A.2d at 21.

70. U.C.C. § 9-403.
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filed by the agent. Under Section 9-303, the New York lender was therefore entitled to the status of a secured creditor in the bankruptcy pro71
ceedings.
In Safeway Finance Company v. Heintzl,72 the security interest of a
vendor in Georgia, who sold a car in that state through an installment
purchase agreement, was duly recorded according to Georgia ldw and assigned
to plaintiff finance company. The purchaser, taking the car along, changed
his residence to Pennsylvania in the latter part of July 1956. In January
1957, he fraudulently applied for and received a Pennsylvania certificate of
title to the automobile without having plaintiff's encumbrance noted thereon.
He subsequently sold the car to the defendant. In the replevin action brought
by plaintiff, the court resolved the issue by relying upon Section 9-103(3)
which provides that if personal property is already subject to a security
interest when it is brought into an enacting state, the validity of the security
interest in such state is to be determined by the law of the state where the
property was when the security interest was created. It also provides that:
If the security interest was already perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest attached and before being brought into this state, the security interest
continues perfected in this state for four months and also thereafter
if within the four month period it is perfected in this state. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the court ruled for defendant since plaintiff failed to perfect its
security interest within the required four month period and defendant was
a good faith purchaser for value without notice.
In Casterline v. G.M.A.C.,73 a vendee entered into a conditional sales
contract in New York for the purchase of a car and, one day later, brought
the vehicle into Pennsylvania, reselling same to defendant. The plaintiff's
security interest, having been filed within 10 days after sale, was retroactively
effective to date of acquisition under the New York Conditional Sales Act.7 4
Hence, even though plaintiff's encumbrance was not of record at the time of
defendant's purchase, the superior court ruled that the auto was subject
to repossession under Section 9-103(3).
71. Other reasons for invalidating the filing of the agent were argued by the
receiver. However, the court ruled that the description of the collateral in the
financing statement complied with U.C.C. § 9-110 which provides: "For the purpose of
this article any description is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably
identifies the thing described."
(Emphasis added.)
To the contention that the
security agreement was invalid in so far as it attempted to reach after acquired
accounts receivable, the court responded by citing U.C.C. § 9-204(3) providing that
obligations may be secured by collateral acquired after the execution of the security
agreement or transfer of value thereunder.
72. 43 Erie Co. L. J. 132 (Pa. 1959).
73. 195 Pa. Super. 344, 171 A.2d 813 (1961).
74. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 65.
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A recently reported lower court case distinguished and refused to follow
the reasoning of both the trial and appellate courts in the Casterline case.
Although faced with similar facts, also involving a New York secured creditor, the court in G.M.A.C. v. Manheim Auto Auction 75 refused to permit
plaintiff to repossess the vehicle. It rejected application of the "10 day retroactive filing" provision of the New York Conditional Sales Act, and thus
ruled that the encumbrance was actually unperfected upon entry of the
vehicle into Pennsylvania. The court, relying on its construction of Section
9-103, stated:
If the New York contract had been filed before the automobile was
brought into Pennsylvania or if the Pennsylvania certificate of title
had not been issued until after the New York contract was filed we
would decide otherwise, for in either instance the security interest
would have been perfected in New York before the automobile
was brought into Pennsylvania and the plaintiff would have been
76
perfected by the Code.
In support of its conclusion, the court also observed that Section 9-103(4)
of the revised Code (under which the operative facts of this case arose)
provides:
Notwithstanding subsections . . . (3),

if personal property is

covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state
or any other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate
of title of any security interest in the property as a condition of
perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate. (Emphasis added.)
A secured creditor appealed from the bankruptcy referee's disallowance
of his claim for priority in In The Matter of Einhorn Brothers, Inc.77 The
appellant, in return for loans made to the bankrupt, attempted to obtain a
security interest in certain merchandise inventory. The secured interest
was perfected by filing in January 1957 and on November 12, 1957, a
landlord levied a distraint for rent against the property of the bankrupt.
The bankruptcy proceedings were initiated on November 18, 1957, resulting
in the landlord being given priority over the secured creditor.
Although a state statute provided that on a sale following a distraint for
rent, the claim of a landlord "shall be a lien on the proceeds . . . and

be paid first out of the proceeds of such sale, ' 78 the objecting secured creditor
contended that the law in this regard had been changed on adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Pennsylvania. It reasoned that since Section
9-104(b) of the Code provides that the Code does not apply "to a landlord's
75. 57 Lanc. L. Rev. 457 (Pa. 1961).
76. Id. at 463.
77. 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 322 (Supp. 1960).
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. " Code security interests are thus necessarily superior to land-

lords' liens. The court, however, concluded that Section 9-104(b) did not
change existing landlord priority law. It then ruled that under Pennsylvania
law the secured creditor's lien was inferior to that of the landlord. Next,
the court found that under the applicable provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy
Act, costs of administration and wage claims had priority over the landlord's
statutory lien. 79 Finally, the court upheld the referee's conclusion that the
interest of the secured creditor, being inferior under Pennsylvania law
to that of the landlord, was also impliedly subordinated by Section 67c(1)
to the costs of administration and wage claims as well as the landlord's lien.80
Having already ruled in favor of the landlord's priority, the court rejected
an alternative argument based on Section 9-310 of the Code which had been
made on behalf of the landlord. This section provides:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
service or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien given by statute . . . for such materials or services

takes priority over a perfected security interest ....
The court ruled that a landlord's lien does not constitute a lien for
''services or materials" within the above language and therefore was not
entitled to take a priority over a security interest. 81 In reaching this conclusion the court noted that Section 9-104, setting forth specific types of
transactions not subject to Article 9, separately excludes from its coverage
landlords' liens8 2 and liens "given by statute or other rule of law for services
'83
or materials except as provided in Section 9-310 on priority of such liens."
The court concluded that this separate listing of landlords' liens and liens
for "services or materials" was indicative of a legislative intent that the
two catagories were mutually exclusive. In support of this determination,
it was also noted that Comment 1 to Section 9-310 provides that that section
was intended to secure claims arising from work enhancing or preserving
the value of collateral. The act of leasing premises certainly bore no
relation to the value of the goods situated thereon.
Two trucks in the possession of a bailment lessee were seized, in
Commonwealth v. Two Ford Trucks,8 4 for failure to pay fines imposed on
overloading in violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. 85 After being
79. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1) (1953).

80. Citing In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957).
81. The possibility of such an interpretation had been set forth in the Pennsylvania
Bar Association notes to § 9-310, and also in Schwartz, Pennsylvania Chattel Security
and the Commercial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 530, 540-541 (1950).
82. U.C.C. § 9-104(b).
83. U.C.C. § 9-104(c).
84. 185 Pa. Super. 292, 137 A.2d 847 (1957).
85. Pa. Laws 1955, act 225, § 5.
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informed that the trucks were to be sold for non-payment of the fines, the
bailor filed a petition to recover the trucks. In the petition it was alleged that
the bailor held legal title thereto because of encumbrances which, in accord
with Pennsylvania law, had been duly noted on the certificate of title covering
each vehicle. 86 While the lower court granted priority to the Commonwealth,
on appeal, the superior court reversed and granted priority to the bailor.
It conceded that the applicable statute required the confiscation of an
impounded car as against an owner who was guilty of overloading and who
refused to pay the required fine. However, it concluded that the bailor
lessor was an encumbrancer rather than an owner for purposes of the statute,
and that payment of encumbrances prior to fines and costs was required.
The court noted that under Section 9-102, the Secured Transactions Article
is made applicable to transactions of pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage,
chattel trust, deed trust, factors lien, equipment trust, conditional sales and
bailment lease. It further pointed out that under Section 9-107, the bailor
would be specifically categorized as a holder of a purchase money security
interest.
PART 2
VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES THERETO

A petition by the purchaser of an automobile to open a judgment confessed by plaintiff bank was granted in First National Bank of Milville v.
Horwatt.7 The purchaser had executed a note and attached installment
sales contract to an auto dealer who in turn assigned the instrument to the
bank. As grounds for opening the judgment, the buyer alleged that the
car, some two months after purchase, was returned to the dealer's garage
for repairs, and while there, a third party creditor seized it as collateral on
loans extended to the dealer. Buyer also alleged that the dealer had never
forwarded his application for a certificate of title as required by their
agreement.
In granting the petition to open judgment, the court relied on the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act prohibiting motor vehicle installment contracts from entailing the execution of notes by the buyer, which
if separately negotiated, would cut off as to third parties, defenses good
against the original seller.8 8 This statute further provides that when the
final payment on a motor vehicle installment contract is made, the vendor
must transfer the certificate of title to the buyer showing satisfaction of
the encumbrance. 89 The buyer in this case was willing to make payment
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 207 (1960).
87. 192 Pa. Super. 581, 162 A.2d 60 (1960).
88. The court also relied on a provision in the sales contract to which the note
in question was physically attached which provided that "the assignee shall have all
rights and be subject to all obligations of the seller hereunder."
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 (G) (1947).
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on the note on which judgment was confessed if the bank would furnish
a certificate of title to the vehicle. However, plaintiff bank was unable
and refused to do so.
The plaintiff bank contended that the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act
was repealed in a large part by the Uniform Commercial Code. The superior
court noted that the act was not included among those specifically repealed
by Section 10-102 of the Code. It then considered whether it was impliedly
repealed by Section 10-103 which states that: "All acts and parts of acts
inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed." In support of the conclusion
that the legislature did not intend to repeal the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act by enactment of the Code, the court cited Section 9-201 which provides
that nothing in the Secured Transactions Article "validates any charge or
practice illegal under any rule of law or regulation governing . . . retail
installment sales . . . ." It also noted that Code Section 9-203 as enacted in

Pennsylvania specifically provides that a transaction, although subject to
Article 9, must also comply with the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act.
The plaintiff bank further argued that under Section 3-302, it was a
holder in due course thereof, and that, under 3-305 (Rights of a Holder
in Due Course), it took free from personal defenses assertable by the
purchaser against the dealer. The court noted that Section 3-103(2)
specifies that the provisions of Article 3 are subject to the provisions of
Article 9. Also relied on was Code Section 9-206 to refute appellant's
holder in due course argument. Special emphasis was placed on the Comments to that section which state that:
Some retail installment selling acts and other comparable legislation now prohibit the use of negotiable notes in the consumer
field. Such a provision should not be repealed by the enactment
of this Article. Furthermore without statutory aid there are indications in the case law that courts are beginning to question the
holder-in-due-course status of finance companies or banks regularly
discounting a dealer's consumer chattel paper. 0
A dissent reasoned that under Section 9-307, a consumer buyer of
inventory would prevail over a holder of a security interest. 91 Therefore,
the dissent concluded that the remedy of the consumer buyer, if he purchased the car in good faith and in the regular course of business (and
the dissenting judge was apparently skeptical that this was the case), was
not against the assignee of the note, but rather against the secured creditor
attaching the car as collateral for the loan given on the dealer's inventory.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-206, Comment 2 (1954). The court also quoted
the Pennsylvania Bar Association notes to U.C.C. § 9-206, which state that in motor
vehicle sales "the execution of such a note does not prevent the debtor from asserting

against subsequent holders whatever defenses he may have against the seller."
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 (G) (1947).
91. Weisel v. McBride, 191 Pa. Super. 411, 156 A.2d 613 (1959).

See
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In Girard Trust Corn Exchange Batk v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc.
(No. 2),92 the bank petitioned to have receivers of Warren Lepley Ford,
Inc. deliver and surrender to it certain motor vehicles or the proceeds of
their sale. With reference to five of these vehicles, Warren Lepley Ford
had executed motor vehicle installment sales contracts as both buyer and
seller thereof and had assigned them to the petitioner bank. A title certificate had been issued for one of these five vehicles to Warren Lepley Ford
and noted thereon was an encumbrance in the amount of approximately 1700
dollars in favor of petitioner bank. Warren Lepley Ford used this first
vehicle as a parts truck and the other four as demonstrators. The court
ruled that the attempted sales by Warren Lepley to itself were invalid
"wash sales." However, it concluded that the assignment of the contract
to the bank was not completely void, but was effective to transfer title
and a security interest under Sections 1-201(37) and 9-102(1)(a) to the
bank. This constituted a novation whereby installment contracts were
substituted for financing under a previously executed wholesale credit plan.
Section 9-302 provides, with certain exceptions, that a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests. One of these exceptions
specifies that compliance with any statute requiring indication of a security
interest on a certificate of title is equivalent to filing under Article 9 and
will create a perfected security interest. Since petitioner bank's encumbrance
was properly noted on the title certificate of the truck, the security interest
was deemed perfected and superior to that of the receivers. 93 The petitioner's
failure to similiarly proceed as respects the other four vehicles prevented
perfection of the security interests therein. The court ruled that, since the
wholesale credit plan under which petitioner had filed his financing statement
did not permit automobiles to be used as demonstrators, the rights of the
94
receivers were paramount as to these latter vehicles.
With reference to another group of motor vehicles, the receiver claimed
that petitioner failed to perfect a security interest under its wholesale credit
plan contract because the security agreement did not contain an adequate description of the collateral.95 The court reasoned, however, that a description of
the collateral as "passenger and commercial automobiles" constituted reasonable identification, hence complying with the requirements of Section 9-110.06
92. 13 D. & C.2d 119 (Pa. 1957).

93. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(3), 9-303 and 9-306.
94. Citing U.C.C. § 9-301 (c), which under the current code is § 9-301 (a).
95. The court noted that all other requirements of §§ 9-203 and 9-204(1) of
the Code for creation of an enforceable security interest were complied with. The
agreement granting the security interest in the collateral was in writing and signed
by the debtor; the secured party gave value in exchange for the security interest;
and, the debtor had rights in the collateral.
96. Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 13 D. & C.2d
119, 128 (Pa. 1957). The court also stated:
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The court then noted that an isshe was not raised regarding the sufficiency of
the financing statement with regard to these vehicles since the receiver conceded that the Code requirements for description of collateral in a financing
statement were complied with by a statement indicating the type of
97
property covered therein.
The court also disagreed with the receiver's contention that mere failure
to insist on regular timely installment payments constituted constructive
fraud perpetrated by petitioner on other creditors of the debtor. It noted
that the other creditors were put on notice of petitioner's claim by its
financing statement and, under Section 9-208, they could easily have obtained a
statement of the account from petitioner. 8
In National-Dime Bank v. Cleveland Brothers Equipment Co., 99 plaintiff claimed a security interest in a tractor and "backhoe" shovel which
defendant, a farm equipment dealer, had received as a trade-in. Defendant
objected to plaintiff's complaint on grounds that the "Security Agreements"
in question were invalid because signed only by the debtor and not by the
secured party. The court agreed that Section 9-402 of the Code requires a
financing statement to be signed by both the debtor and the secured party.
However, it ruled that a security agreement is valid under the express
provisions of Section 9-203(1)(b), if, in addition to other requirements,
"the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description
of the collateral .

.

.

."

(Emphasis added.)

A technical description of

the shovel100 in the "Security Agreements" without inclusion of the serial
number was also held to comply with Section 9-110 of the Code, since,
although it was not "specific," it did "reasonably identify" the thing described.
Considering the nature of the agreement, the nature of the business of the two
parties and the business practices of automobile dealers and their financing
agents, we think the description is sufficient. The code has removed the
necessity of listing by serial number property used as collateral in a security
agreement. Under the business practice of automobile dealer financing, a
specific description of each vehicle as it was financed would be an unrealistic
and unreasonable requirement. The only description feasible is a general
description. The official comment to Section 9-110 of the Code . . . provides:
"The requirement of the description of collateral (see Section 9-203 and comment
thereto) is evidentiary. The test of sufficiency of a description laid down by this
Section is that the description do the job assigned to it-that it make possible
the identification of the thing described. Under this rule courts should refuse
to follow the holdings, often found in the older chattel mortgage cases, that
descriptions are insufficient unless they are of the most exact and detailed
nature, the so-called 'serial number' test."
97. U.C.C. § 9-402(l).
98. U.C.C. § 9-208 gives the right to demand disclosure only to the debtor.
However, the comments thereto state that the debtor "will typically request a statement
in connection with negotiations with subsequent creditors and purchasers, or for the
purpose of establishing his credit standing and proving which of his assets are free
of the security interest."
99. 74 Dauph. 194, 20 D. & C.2d 511 (Pa. 1959).
100. Ibid.
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In this case, the court relied on and quoted extensively from the Comments
to the various sections upon which it based its decision. 01
In Erb v. Stoner,10 2 a purchase money security agreement covering six
cows provided that the debtor "hereby gives to the Secured Party a security
interest in any offspring of the said cattle or in any cattle subsequently
acquired by the debtor, as either replacements, or additions." While in
default, the debtor appointed an auctioneer as his agent for purposes of
selling his herd of sixteen cows. Although three of the sixteen were expressly included in the security agreement, the remaining thirteen were
not so included, having subsequently been acquired by the debtor. The
auctioneer had notice of plaintiff's security interest, but nevertheless refused
to turn over any portion of the receipts received from the sale. Plaintiff
thereafter sued the auctioneer to recover the amount owed by the debtor.
The court preliminarily ruled that plaintiff had a valid security interest in
the three cows which had been specifically included in the security agreement; also, that the after-acquired property clause in the agreement effectively covered the thirteen cows acquired subsequent to execution of the
security agreement. Defendant, therefore, was required to transfer from
the proceeds of the sale, the amount of the unpaid balance due under the
purchase money security interest.
Defendant conceded that Section 9-204 expresly provides that collateral,
whenever acquired, may secure any advances made or value given at any
time pursuant to the security agreement. It contended, however, that this
section must be read in relation to Section 9-108 which provides:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation or
otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in
part by after-acquired property his security interest in the afteracquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for such new value
and not as security for a preexisting claim if the debtor acquires
his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of its
business ....

The court concluded that the above language merely states that a security
interest in after-acquired collateral shall be presumed to have been acquired
in exchange for a new value given by the creditor. This section does not
state that a creditor may acquire a security interest in after acquired property
only if he gives new value to the debtor. The court noted that Section 9-108
is important principally in insolvency proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act
or to state statutes "making certain transfers for antecedent debt voidable
as preferences and [is] therefore not irreconcilable with section 9-204,
101. The case also cited and quoted a general introductory commentary to
Article 9 of the Code prepared by private individuals rather than the Code draftsmen.
102. 56 Lanc. L. Rev. 434, 19 D. & C.2d 25 (Pa. 1959).
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subsec. 3. ' 1 °3 In support of this conclusion, the court cited Section 1-102
specifying that the Code is to be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying policies of simplification and modernization of the law governing commercial transactions, preservation of flexibility in commercial
transactions, encouragement of continued expansion of commercial parctices
1 4
and achievement of uniformity of law among the various jurisdictions. 0
PART 3
RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES; PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY
INTERESTS; RULES OF PRIORITY

Fifteen days prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, two secured
creditors filed financing statements pursuant to the requirements of Sections
9-302(1) (a) and 9-401(1) (a) covering accounts receivable of the bankrupt
10 5
debtor in Hurwitz, Trustee v. Fidelity American Financial Corp. et al.

Claiming under the Code and the assignment contract, they took possession of
the debtors' assets including furniture, books, records, leases and cash. The
trustee in bankruptcy initiated suit to recover the value of these assets on the

theory that the taking thereof constituted a voidable preferential transfer. The
secured creditors defended on the basis that they had security interests in
the property and accordingly moved for summary judgment. The court
denied the motion on grounds that mixed questions of fact and law were
involved. Apparently the court felt it needed more facts regarding the property covered by the security agreement and financing statements. If only
the accounts receivable were covered, the taking of the other above mentioned
assets by the secured creditors would have constituted a preferential
transfer.

In U.S. for Use of Greer v. G.P. Fleetwood & Co., Inc. et al.," °6 a
subcontractor executed a performance bond with a surety in favor of his
103. Id. at 439, 19 D. & C.2d at 30. Even if it were considered irreconcilable, §
9-204(3), being the clause last in order of date or position, would have to prevail
under the Statutory Construction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 564 (1952).
104. The court also cited the comments to § 9-108 which provide:
Many financing transactions contemplate that the secured party will be secured
not only by the debtor's existing assets but by assets thereafter acquired by
him in the operation of his business. This Article generally validates such
after-acquired property interests (see Section 9-204 and Comment) although
they may be subordinated to later purchase money interests under Section

9-312(4).
Interests in after-acquired property have never been considered, nor should
they be considered, as involving, merely because of the after-acquired feature,
transfers of property for antecedent debt. Subsection (2) makes explicit
what has been true under the case law; an after-acquired property interest
is not, by virtue of that fact alone, security for a preexisting claim. This rule
is of importance principally in insolvency proceedings under the federal Bankruptcy Act or state statutes which make certain transfers for antecedent debt
voidable as preferences.
105. 179 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
106. 165 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
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contractor. The performance bond agreement gave the surety a contingent
assignment of the subcontractor's accounts receivable to be used for reimtursement of the surety in the event of liability under the bond. This contingency having occurred, the surety now claims that under the terms of
its surety contract it is entitled to reimbursement from accounts receivable
owed the subcontractor. The court ruled that the surety did not acquire
a perfected security interest which was good against the trustee because
it had failed to comply with the requirements for perfection under the
Secured Transactions Article of the Code. It noted that Code Section 9-106
defines a "contract right" as a right to payment under contract not yet
earned by performance and concluded that the contingent security interest
in the funds was a "contract right." Since the surety had failed to record
the security agreement, it was unperfected. 10 7 The trustee in bankruptcy
having the status of a lien creditor from the date of filing of the petition in
bankruptcy,10 8 a security agreement unperfected as of such date would be
invalid against him. 10 9 The court therefore ruled that the surety company
was relegated to the status of a general creditor.
In Union National Bank & Trust Co. v. Geyer Auction, Inc.,110 the
owner of an automobile, fraudulently claiming that he had lost the original
certificate of title, applied to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles for a duplicate.
He subsequently borrowed money from plaintiff using the original certificate
of title as collateral. The plaintiff in due course applied for and was duly
issued a duplicate certificate of title which noted the encumbrance of the
loan. It also filed a financing statement covering the vehicle in the county
in which the debtor resided. Sometime later, the debtor fraudulently
utilized the duplicate certificate of title which he obtained from the bureau
as collateral for a loan obtained from another creditor. After repaying this
second creditor and having the encumbrance on this duplicate certificate
of title marked paid and satisfied, the debtor utilized this same duplicate
certificate in selling the car to defendant, an innocent purchaser. Plaintiff
attempted to recover the car or the proceeds thereof which defendant had
obtained from its sale.
The court noted that Section 9-302(2) (b) expressly provides that the
filing provisions of the Secured Transactions Article shall not be applicable
to property subject to a statute of the enacting state providing for central
filing or requiring indication on a certificate of title of security interests
held therein. It therefore ruled that the Pennsylvania legislature, having
provided for central registration of certificates of title covering motor
107. Pa. Laws 1953, act 1, §§ 9-302, 9-402.
108. Pa. Laws 1953, act 1, § 9-301 (3).
109. Pa. Laws 1953, act 1, § 9-301(1) (b).
110. 18 D. & C.2d 98 (Pa. 1958).
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vehicles,'
did not intend that motor vehicle transactions be subject to the
recording provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The filing of
financing statements covering the vehicles in question in the debtor's
local county was therefore surplusage which did not constitute constructive
notice of the encumbrance. However, the court concluded that plaintiff,
having first obtained a certificate of title from the debtor, should prevail
over the defendant since as between two innocent persons who are victimized
by fraud of a third person, the "victim who first acquired the muniments of
title should prevail ... .
A carrier delivering five automobiles for a vendor to a buyer, in Girard
Trust Bank v. Lepley Ford (No. 1),113 disregarded instructions not to
deliver the automobiles except upon receipt of payment in full. The vendor
sought to recover the cars from the bankrupt buyer's receiver on the
basis of a written agreement which provided that, for the purpose of securing
payment to the vendor,
Title to each COMPANY PRODUCT shall be and remain with
the company until receipt by the company in cash of the full purchase price therefor, together with all charges . . . unless the sale

is on credit, in which event title shall pass on delivery to carrier or
to dealer, whichever first shall occur.
The agreement also provided that the company "shall have the right to
retake possession of and resell each COMPANY PRODUCT until title
to such product shall have passed to the dealer."
The court concluded that the vendor was the holder of a security
interest under this agreement. It noted that Section 2-401(1) (a)14
specifies that any attempt by the seller to reserve title in goods delivered
or otherwise identified to a contract for sale is limited to a reservation of
a security interest. It also noted that the seller's interest in the cars
fell within the definition of "security interest" contained in Section 1-201 (37)
because it secured "payment or performance of an obligation." Since the
vendor had not recorded his security interest as required by Section 9-302,
the receiver had a superior interest in the automobiles under Section 9-301.
This provision recites that an unperfected security interest is subordinate
to the rights of a lien creditor who becomes such without knowledge
111. The Vehicle Code of Pennsylvania requires that certificates of title be issued
for all motor vehicles and that records thereof must be centrally filed. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 75, § 202(b) (1960). It also provides that any encumbrances on motor vehicles
shall be noted on such certificates of title and that liens may be recorded thereon by
making application for a duplicate certificate of title on a form furnished by the
Secretary of Revenue. Notation of an encumbrance on a certificate of title constitutes
adequate
order to
112.
113.
114.

notice to the public of the lien and the vehicle need not be transferred in
validate the lien. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 203(b) (1949).
Op. cit. supra note 92, at 103.
12 D. & C.2d 351 (Pa. 1957).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-401 (Supp. 1960).
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of the security interest and before it is perfected, 115 and that a receiver
or trustee in bankruptcy acquires the status of a lien creditor from the date
of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 116
The vendor argued that recording was not required since Section
9-302(1) (d) provides that recording is unnecessary for a purchase money
security interest in "consumer goods." The court disagreed for the reason
that the automobiles in question did not constitute "consumer goods" as
that term is defined in Section 9-109(1) of the Code since not "used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
It ruled that such automobiles were "inventory" as that term is defined
in Section 9-109(4) because they were to be held "for resale purposes."
The court also ruled that the vendor was not exempt from the recording
requirements of Article 9 by Section 9-302(2) (b) (recording is not required for property subject to a statute of an enacting state providing for
central filing or indication on a certificate of title of security interests in
the collateral) because, under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code,1 7 manufactures and dealers until resale of the vehicles are not required to obtain
certificates of title for new motor vehicles.
The court also emphatically rejected the seller's contention that its
retention of title to the automobiles should give it priority over the receiver.
It stated:
One of the changes brought about by the Code is in reference to title
to property.

The common law and the Sales Act . . . made the

rights of the parties to a transaction depend upon the location
of a legal title. The Code however, provides for the rights of
parties irrespective of the location of legal title. .

.

. The first

sentence of Section 2-401 of the Code provides: Each provision
of this article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies
of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers
to such title." 8
115.
116.
117.
118.
The

Pa. Laws 1953, act 1, § 9-301(1) (b).
Pa. Laws 1953, act 1, § 9-301(3).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 203(b) (1960).
The court also noted that the comment to U.C.C. § 2-401 provides that:
arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale and

the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences are stated as
following directly from the contract and action taken under it without resorting
to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the
determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between
practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing
of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions
proof of words and action of a tangible character.
The court further pointed out the conclusiveness of U.C.C. § 9-202 on the issue:
"Each provision of this article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies
whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor." See also U.C.C.
§§ 9-202 and 2-101 and comments thereto.
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Finally, the court ruled that Section 1-102(3)(e) of the Code providing that "Subject to the foregoing subsections and except as otherwise
specifically provided in this Act, the effect of provisions of this Act may
be varied by agreement" (emphasis added) was of no assistance to the
vendor. In so ruling the court relied on Section 1-102(3) (b): "Except
as otherwise provided by this Act the rights and duties of a third party may
not be adversely varied by an agreement to which he is not a party or by
which he is not otherwise bound." Hence, it concluded that a vendor could
not through use of the sales contract evade the recording requirements of
Article 9 and thereby prejudice the rights of parties subsequently dealing
with the vendee.
Two cases have arisen involving the relative priorities between purchaser and holder of the security interest in inventories. In Weisel v.
McBride, n 9 where a car was purchased from a dealer's inventory prior to
attachment of the security interest which occurred while the vehicle was
in for servicing, it was held that the purchaser should prevail. The court
noted that, under Section 9-307(1) of the Code, a "buyer in ordinary course
from inventory" would take free of a security interest even though he knew
of the terms and existence of the security interest. The court also cited
the "entrusting" provisions of Section 2-403 and the Comments thereto
in support of this result.
An auto dealer, in Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes,120 executed a
blanket security agreement, duly recorded and covering all vehicles on the
premises, in favor of a finance company. This security interest was later
reinforced as to one vehicle by the execution of a trust receipt and judgment
note coupled with the transfer of the "dealers certificate of title" noting the
encumbrance. Upon sale of the car by the dealer, the finance company
attempted to assert replevin. The court ruled in favor of the buyer and
cited Code Section 9-307(1) and 2-403 as well as Weisel v. McBride
above. It reiterated that even a holder of a perfected security interest in
inventory would not prevail over a buyer in the ordinary course and also
pointed out that notation of an encumbrance on the dealer's certificate of
title was an ineffective method of perfection. Under Pennsylvania law, l 2 '
encumbrances against inventory need not be noted on the dealer's certificate
of title; hence, the court ruled that recording in compliance with Article 9
was necessary for perfection in such a case.
In U.G.I. v. McFalls, 22 plaintiff appliance dealer sold a laundry
dryer by installment contract to purchaser for use in his home. While in
119.
120.
121.
122.

191 Pa. Super. 411, 156
194 Pa. Super. 503, 168
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75,
18 D. & C.2d 713 (Pa.

A.2d 613 (1959).
A.2d 600 (1961).
§ 201(b) (1960).
1959).
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default, buyer fraudulently resold the dryer to defendant, a dealer in used
household appliances, who purchased for purposes of resale. The plaintiff sought to recover the dryer from defendant even though it had not
recorded its security interest. Since the original sale was to a purchaser
"for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes," the court
ruled that plaintiff had sold "consumer goods" and thus was exempt from
Code recording requirements. Section 9-302 provides that "(1) A financing
statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except . . . (d)
a purchase money security interest in consumer goods . . . ." The court

then cited Section 9-307(2) of the Code which provides:
In the case of consumer goods . . . a buyer takes free of a security

interest even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of
the security interest, for value and for his own personal, family
or household purposes . . . unless prior to the purchase the secured
party has filed a financing statement covering such goods.
The court ruled that, defendant having purchased the dryer for purposes of
resale rather than as consumer goods, filing of a financing statement covering
such goods was not required in order for plaintiff to prevail.
PART 4
FILING
In the matter of Luckenbill,123 the vendor, pursuant to two installment
sales contracts, sold store equipment to a husband and wife operating two
retail outlets in a single county. Copies of the contract were duly filed
in that county. However, copies were not filed with the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, as required by the Code, until several weeks after the
debtor's adjudication of bankruptcy.
The vendor and the trustee in bankruptcy agreed that the vendor had
a "security interest" 2 4 and that the goods sold, having been "bought for
use primarily in business," constituted "equipment" as defined in the
Code.' 2 5 Therefore, pursuant to Sections 9-302 and 9-401(1), filing was
required in the office of the Secretary of Commonwealth as well as in the
single county wherein the debtors maintained their retail establishments.
Due to the fact that a vendor's security interest, with limited exceptions,
is not perfected until the time of filing,' 26 perfection did not occur until
the financing statements were filed in both of the required places, which was
subsequent to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Citing Section 9-301 (1) (c) of the Code, the court therefore held that
123.

156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957).

124. U.C.C. § 1-201 (37).
125. U.C.C. § 9-109 (2).
126. U.C.C. § 9-303 (1).
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the vendor did not occupy the position of a secured creditor in the bankruptcy
proceedings. Section 9-301(1)(c) provides that an unperfected security
interest is subordinated to the rights of a lien creditor who becomes such
127
without knowledge of a secured interest prior to its perfection.
The vendor also contended that his partial filing "in good faith" prior
to the debtor's bankruptcy constituted notice of the security interest because
interested parties thereby had constructive "knowledge of the filing of
a financing statement which indicated a security interest in all collateral
wherever located." Therefore it argued that under Section 9-401(2) such
partial filing was effective. The court rejected this argument on the grounds
that its effect would be to nullify the dual recording requirement of Section
9-401(1) and make reliance on the accuracy of the central registry
impossible.
PART 5
DEFAULT
In Matter of Adrian Research and Chemical Co., Inc.,128 the Court
of Appeals of the Third Circuit, overruling a District Court, held that the
lien of a perfected security interest is not destroyed by the creditor's taking
judgment, issuing execution and causing a levy to be made against the
debtor.
In this case the secured party had obtained and duly filed a security
agreement from a tenant in consideration of past due rentals. The collateral
for the security interest was office, laboratory and plant equipment on the
leased premises. A judgment note for the amount of past rentals due was
executed simultaneously by the debtor, and the creditor entered judgment
thereon. Approximately two weeks prior to the filing of a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy by the debtor, the secured party issued execution on the
judgment and caused a levy to be made on all of the debtor's personal
property, including that covered by the security agreement. The secured
creditor subsequently filed a reclamation petition in the bankruptcy proceeding.
This petition was denied by the referee and the District Court on the
grounds that petitioner's election to confess judgment, issue execution
and levy on the assets of the debtor was inconsistent with the right to take
possession of the collateral. However, the appellate court ruled that this
election did not constitute conduct inconsistent with the subsequent assertion by the secured creditor of his claim on the collateral. It reasoned
that each of these courses of conduct sought to obtain payment for the
127. U.C.C. § 9-301 (3) provides that a trustee in bankruptcy is a "lien creditor"
from the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed. The court also noted that the same
result would be reached under § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.
128. 269 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1959).
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debt in question and that neither the debtor nor his successor, the trustee
in bankruptcy, were entitled to the collateral security until the debt was
discharged. It concluded that this result was not contrary to any of the
rights given to the secured party on default under Section 9-501 as then
in effect under the 1952 edition of the Code. 129
In County Construction Company v. Livengood Construction Corporation,1 3 0 the lower court dismissed defendant's objection predicated on the

grounds of improper venue. This case involved a creditor's action in replevin
following the debtor's default to recover possession or the value of the
collateral. The defendant contended that venue was improper in that
plaintiff's cause of action arose in a neighboring county and no transaction
out of which the cause of action arose took place in the county wherein the
action was initiated.' 31 In sustaining the action of the lower court, the
supreme court agreed that the cause of action arose in a neighboring county
to which the collateral had been moved at the time the action was commenced.
It noted that under Sections 9-501 and 9-503 of the Code, plaintiff's
right to possession accrued immediately upon defendant's default. However,
since plaintiff had failed to exercise his right of possession in any way, and
nothing in the security agreement prevented the debtor from removing the
collateral to the neighboring county, the defendant's continued possession
thereof and its removal to the neighboring county was not wrongful until
plaintiff demanded possession of the goods.
Nevertheless, the court sustained plaintiff's action in bringing the suit
where it did, on the grounds that the county in which the action was
initiated did qualify as one in which a transaction or occurrence out of
which the cause of action arose had occurred. It noted that the construction
job on which the equipment was to be used was to be performed in that county.
Furthermore, the breach of the security agreement occurred therein and
129. The court also observed that the revised edition of the Code would clarify
beyond doubt the accuracy of this interpretation. This revised edition, which is in
effect in all of the 14 states currently having enacted the Code, provides in § 9-501 (1)
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement a secured party has
the rights and remedies provided in this part. He may reduce his claim to
judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce his security interest by any available
judicial procedure. . . . The rights and remedies referred to in this subsection
are cumulative.
A new § 9-501(5) also provides:
When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien of any levy
which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of any execution based upon
the judgment shall relate back to the date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. A judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is
a foreclosure of the security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning
of this section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter
hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this Article.
130. 393 Pa. 39, 142 A.2d 9 (1958).
131. See PA. R.C.P. 1072(a), 1006(b), 2179(a) (3) and (4).
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after plaintiff's right of possession had accrued, the collateral was removed
therefrom to the neighboring county.
In Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 132 vendor and vendee (both residents

of Delaware) entered into an installment contract for the sale of a boat. The
security interest was subsequently assigned to a Pennsylvania finance
company. Upon default and repossession, the chattel was brought into
Pennsylvania and sold without compliance with the "notice to debtor"
requirements of Section 9-504. The court ruled that Pennsylvania enforcement of a security interest created in another state 133 must comply with

Article 9 of the Code. The secured party's failure to give such notice thus
created a cause of action in the debtor under Section 9-507.
The court, in Tops Cleaners, Inc. (No. 2),134 had appointed an
auditor to hear the objections advanced by the assignee for the benefit of
creditors regarding claims made by certain persons against the debtor's
assets. The vendor of a cash register evidently had a perfected security
interest in such a machine. However, the auditor ruled that this security
interest had been lost for failure to comply with the provisions of Section
9-505. This section provides, inter alia, that repossessed "consumer goods"
must be sold by the repossessing party within 90 days if the debtor has
paid more than 60 percent of the cash price thereon. The court held that
the cash register would not fall within the definition of "consumer goods"
found in Section 9-109 since it was neither purchased nor used primarily
for personal, family or household purposes. Hence, the secured creditor
was not subject to the 90 day sale requirement of Section 9-505 applying
only to "consumer goods" and the security interest in the cash register was
not lost.
132.

193 Pa. Super. 649, 164 A.2d 704 (1960).

133. The court resolved the conflicts of law issue of whether Pennsylvania or
Delaware law applied by relying on U.C.C. § 1-105.
134. 20 D. & C.2d 264 (Pa. 1959).

